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MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.

Whether mental illness and related impairments in the
human psyche should affect an individual's criminal responsibility for law-breaking behavior has always provoked intense and
wide-ranging debate.) This debate clearly reflects society's lack
of consensus concerning the appropriateness and scope of considering mental impairment in assessing individual criminal responsiblility. Thus, it is not unexpected that recently proposals to
abolish the insanity defense have been seriously suggested' or
that noted scholars have urged society to place the disposition of
mentally ill offenders in the exclusive hands of experts. 3 That this
heated discussion continues unabated should come as no surprise, since legal doctrines which excuse or lessen criminal responsibility force us to reexamine the very purposes of imposing
punishment through our criminal justice system.4
To date most scholars who have examined what role, if any,
mental impairment should play in the criminal law have either
considered the subject on broad philosophic grounds5 or have focused narrowly on critiquing specific legal doctrines of excuse or
mitigation based on mental disability.' In this provocative book
the authors not only analyze on a systematic basis most such
specific legal doctrines but also propose a comprehensive and
unifying doctrine (called the "Disability of Mind" doctrine or
D.O.M. for short) which would gather all excuses and defenses
based on mental impairment into a single conceptual framework.
They maintain that this scheme would capture and implement
the "basic intuitions, moral and legal" 7 underlying the wide vari1. See, e.g., A.
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GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE

HART, THE MORALITY OF
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2. See, e.g., S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); NEW YORK
MENTAL HYGIENE, THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK
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3. See, e.g., B. WooTroN, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 835 (1978).
5. See, e.g., J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING (1970).
6. See, e.g., Dix, PsychologicalAbnormality as a Factor in Grading CriminalLiability: Diminished Capacity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Like, 62 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 313 (1971).
7. H. FINGARETTE & A. HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1979) [hereinafter cited as FINGARETTE & HASSE].
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ety of common law doctrines which enable a criminal defendant
to avoid or mitigate responsibility for conduct based on mental
conditions while avoiding the difficulties they have uncovered in
those traditional doctrines.
The authors are well suited for their ambitious undertaking.
Herbert Fingarette is Professor of Philosophy at the University of
California at Santa Barbara and has written extensively on the
subject of criminal insanity." His co-author and daughter, Ann
Fingarette Hasse, is an attorney who works for a leading San
Francisco law firm and has also written on defenses based on
mental disability
0
In Parts I through IV of the book' the authors carefully examine traditional legal defenses based on mental illness or disability which exculpate, either completely or partially, criminal
defendants. Focusing on the M'Naghten test" and the ALI Model
Penal Code test 2 of insanity, the authors argue that the common
law considered insanity to be a defense logically derived from,
and therefore merely a special version of, broader forms of excuse
based either on lack of knowledge, (such as mistake of fact or
ignorance of the law) or on lack of volitional control (such as
duress). After careful analysis, they conclude that the insanity
defense is in fact not logically or necessarily derived from these
traditional common law defenses and that, more importantly,
most insane criminal acts are committed with cognitive knowledge of the nature of the conduct and with substantial volitional
control. Thus, according to the authors, most criminally insane
8. See, e.g., H. FINGARETrE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY (1972).
9. See, e.g., Hasse, Keeping Wolff from the Door: California'sDiminished Capacity
Concept, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1641 (1972).
10. FINGARETrE & HASSE, supra note 7, at 15-198.
a
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Queen Victoria's carriage in her absence, and Drummond, his secretary, took Peel's
in a following carriage. Alas, M'Naghten shot and killed poor Drummond by sheer
fortuity.
12. The ALI test is contained in § 4.01(1) of the Model Penal Code:
§ 4.01 Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility.
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirement of the law.
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offenders know what they are doing and choose to do it.' 3
Furthermore, in their opinion, the insanity defense cannot be
rationalized by viewing it as an opportunity for the defendant
to
demonstrate that the requisite mens rea, or state of mind required by the statutory definition of the offense, was absent.",For
example, in the celebrated case of Daniel M'Naghten 5 it is apparent that the assassin in fact intended to take the life of another
human being and that he had sufficient mental capacity for foresight and prediction to know that shooting a loaded weapon directly at a living person would result in the loss of human life.
Focusing on more contemporary issues, the authors examine
more recent trends which would excuse or reduce criminal responsibility because of alleged incapacity of the offender to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the criminal law.' 6 Fingarette
and Hasse consider criminal defenses based on use of hallucinogens, chronic alcoholism, and narcotic addiction. Relying on
empirical data, the authors argue that neither alcoholism nor
narcotic addiction are "diseases" as understood by the medical
model and, more importantly from their perspective, that addictivQ conduct is not involuntary conduct, since human beings still
retain sufficient will to make difficult choices and to comply with
the requirements of the law.' 7 In their view hard choices still
impose individual responsibility.
Their critique of the "diminished capacity" defense as developed by the California courts is a masterpiece of perceptive
analysis.'1 Any lawyer or law student who has read People
v.
Wolff, '" People v. Conley,20 or People v. Hood' has probably felt
13. FINGARTE & HASSE, supra note 7, at 23-65.
14. Id. at 69.
15. See note 11 supra.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (by a 5-4 vote,
court rejected addiction as defense to charges of possession of heroin);
People v. Drew, 22
Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978) (Supreme Court
of California adopted
the ALI test of insanity after concluding that volitional incapacity
was relevant to criminal
responsibility).
17. FINGARETTE & HASSE, supra note 7, at 137-95. In his philosophical
writings Fingarette stresses the primacy of the human will and its ability to mediate
and channel human
behavior. See, e.g., Fingarette, Feeling Guilty, 16 Am. PHILOSOPHICAL
Q. 159 (1979). Nonetheless, the authors will permit evidence of drug and alcohol
use to be considered in
assessing criminal responsibility but not because such substances
allegedly impair volitional behavioral controls. See notes 23-34 infra and accompanying
text.
18. FINGARETTE & HASSE, supra note 7, at 117-37.
19. 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964). In Wolff,
a 15 year old boy,
after extensive Planning, clubbed his mother to death so that
he could forcibly bring
neighborhood girls to his house in order to engage in sexual acts.
The Supreme Court of
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unease at the damage done to doctrinal and logical consistency
by this court-made defense, even though they may have been
sympathetic to its goal of permitting more individualized assessments of responsibility and blameworthiness. The authors persuasively demonstrate how, in many of these cases, the defendants in fact had the necessary mens rea at the time of the offense
or that, if the evidence of certain disabilities such as intoxication
is relevant to negating the requisite state of mind, then such
evidence should logically be admitted on all mental states, not
just in "specific intent" crimes. As the authors convincingly
show, the courts are permitting a reduction in degree of culpability in certain cases of mental impairment, but they will not permit outright acquittal.
Fingarette and Hasse spend much of the book demonstrating
how traditional doctrines which permit individualized assessment of responsibility accord with our intuitive moral assessments'of relative blameworthiness but at the same time generate
inconsistent results, compromise doctrinal and logical integrity,
lack cohesive unifying principles, and create excessive dependence on the medical model and medical experts in adjudication.
Thus, the authors contend their Disability of Mind doctrine is a
great step forward in the criminal law because it avoids these
pitfalls, while still permitting society to make the refined and
discrete assessments22 of legal and moral responsibility which a
just society requires.
The Disability of Mind doctrine would be the only defense
based on mental impairment available to criminal defendants.
California, in reducing the conviction to second degree murder, concluded the unanimous
expert opinion that the defendant suffered from a permanent form of schizophrenia characterized by complete dissociation between intellect and emotion established that he
could not "maturely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of his act" and therefore
did not commit first degree murder.
20. 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966). In Conley, the California
Supreme Court reversed the first degree murder conviction of the defendant who, after
consuming a substantial amount of alcohol, killed his lover after she told him she intended
to break off their relationship and return to her estranged husband. The court concluded
that evidence of voluntary intoxication should have been admitted to establish that the
defendant lacked the capacity to entertain the "malice aforethought" required for conviction of both first and second degree murder.
21. 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969). In Hood, the California
Supreme Court held that evidence of voluntary intoxication was not admissible to negate
the mens rea required for assault with a deadly weapon since this was a "general intent"
crime rather than a "specific intent" crime. The court's analysis of why such evidence
tends to negate certain mens rea elements and not others is less than satisfactory and is
ultimately best explained as a "policy" decision.

22.

FINGARETrE

& HASSE, supra note 7, at 1-22, 199-217.
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Any mental abnormality or impairment from whatever origin
could be considered. To have any impact on criminal responsibility, however, the abnormality or impairment must have materially affected the defendant's ability rationally to control his
conduct in light of the requirements of the criminal law.
Under the proposed scheme the government must first satisfy its burden of proof in establishing the elements of an offense,
i.e., that the defined crime was in fact committed by the defendant. If established, the inquiry next focuses on whether the defendant, at the time of the alleged offense, suffered from a Disability of Mind and was consequently incapable of rational conduct with respect to the criminal significance of his behavior. The
essential question then becomes whether or not the offender was
"mentally able to take into account, in a practical way and at
least in the essentials the relevance to that conduct of certain
basic norms of criminal law. '23 The defense would have to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant lacked the
mental capacity for such rational conduct as a result of a

D.0.M.21

The authors would impose minimal limitations on the type
of evidence which could be considered in such an inquiry. Thus
medical experts would still provide factual information-but not
in diagnostic conclusions-about the defendant.2 5 Additional
23. Id. at 208.
24. Whether allocating the burden of persuasion (as well as the burden of production)
to the defendant complies with constitutional due process as mandated by the fourteenth
amendment is not clear. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 424 U.S. 684 (1975), the Supreme Court
struck down on due process grounds a Maine homicide statute which allocated to the
defendant the burden of persuading the jury that he had acted in the heat of passion and
was therefore guilty only of voluntary manslaughter. In a concurring opinion Justice
Rehnquist in dicta stated that there was no constitutional prohibition on requiring the
defendant to carry the burden of persuasion in establishing the insanity defense since due
process only required the state to prove all material elements of crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 705. Justice Rehnquist evidently considers insanity to be an excuse rather
than a denial of mens rea or of actus reus. In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977),
the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute which required the defendant to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance in order to reduce an intentional killing from second degree murder to manslaughter. The Court evidently was persuaded that this special defense was more favorable
to defendants than the common law defense of heat of passion, and that the state could
therefore trade off the burden of persuasion for a defense more favorable to a defendant.
Since Fingarette and Hasse do not consider the D.O.M. to be a negation either of mens
rea or of actus reus, and because their standard for responsibility is arguably more favorable to defendants, their allocation of the burden of persuasion to the defendant as to the
existence of a D.O.M. would probably be considered constitutionally acceptable by a
majority of the current Supreme Court.
25. FINGARETrE & HASSE, supra note 7, at 205.
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data concerning the defendant's personality and biography would
also be welcomed. Permitting the jury to consider a broad range
of information about the defendant and to assess the defendant's
capacity for rational behavior in light of this information has the
added benefit, according to the authors, of explicitly recognizing
that the jury is, at least in part, making a fundamental "policy"
decision (as opposed to a factual finding) in determining whether
it is reasonable in light of all the facts known about a particular
26
defendant to expect him to abide by society's rules of behavior.
If there is such a mental impairment and if it is dominant,
then the defendant is without criminal responsibility.? According
to the authors, such a defendant is not offering a traditional excuse recognized at common law. Rather, he is demonstrating that
he is "outside" the law and is thus not a "response-able" person
since, contrary to the law's fundamental factual assumption, he
does not share the community's values, skills, and understandings and, consequently, is incapable of responding to commonly
28
accepted legal norms or rules. According to Fingarette and
Hasse such a defendant lacks the "rationality" indispensable for
criminal responsibility. This "rationality" consists of a
"minimum shared background-nexus of basic perceptions and
values, which provides the basic standards relevant to criminal
mala in se ' '2 and is presumptively shared by every member of
the community until the contrary is demonstrated in a particular
case.
If the person suffered from a material but not predominant
D.O.M., then he is to be found guilty of the charged offense and
also to be suffering from a partial D.O.M. Though there is still
significant criminal responsibility for the behavior, this verdict
permits a less severe punishment to be imposed than would normally be called for. Importantly, it is the lack of capacity for
rational "shaping of beliefs, moods, intentions, decisions and actions in regard to criminal law standards" which is a3 °necessary
predicate for the successful assertion of the defense. An individual who possesses such capacity but fails to exercise it could
26. Id. at 233; cf. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(Bazelon, J., dissenting and concurring) (Judge Bazelon made a similar proposal which
would divorce the jury's factfinding from expert opinion by also using a conclusory standard).
27. FINGARErE & HASSE, supra note 7, at 200.
28. Id. at 208-11.
29. Id. at 224-25.
30. Id. at 210-11, 230.
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not avail himself of the doctrine.
Should the jury determine that the defendant suffered from
a D.O.M., complete or partial, it must then determine if there
was "culpability in the context of origin." ' 3' Put differently, was
the defendant himself responsible for inducing the condition? If
so, then the defendant can be found responsible for the act of
inducing or permitting the onset of the impairing mental condition and, consequently, he can at the very least be found guilty
of an offense either of recklessness or negligence, since he was
careless in permitting his risk-creating condition to occur. For
example, the defendant who voluntarily consumed a substantial
quantity of alcohol and then killed another person while suffering
a complete D.O.M. would still be held responsible for the riskcreating act of voluntary intoxication which resulted in death and
32
would be convicted either of reckless or negligent homicide.
Finally, if a defendant is found not "response-able" because
of a complete D.O.M. or only partially "response-able" because
of a D.O.M., there would be a mandatory post-trial commitment
and examination to ascertain if he is dangerous to himself or to
others and, if so, whether other techniques of social control or
treatment are appropriate. The authors, however, eschew any
specific consideration of post-verdict disposition of defendants
34
who successfully assert the D.O.M. defense.
The Disability of Mind doctrine poses serious questions
which require careful and reflective consideration. It is both expansive and limiting when compared to traditional insanity defenses. It is expansive in that affective or mood disorders could
successively establish a complete or partial D.O.M. Neither the
M'Naghten nor ALI tests permit this. 3 It is limiting in that the
D.O.M. could not be established by demonstrating volitional
impairment, i.e., substantial difficulty in conforming one's conduct to the requirements of the criminal law. The ALI test would
permit this.36 In permitting only cognitive and affective impairment to exclude or reduce criminal responsibility, the D.O.M.
doctrine may be criticized for "compartmentalizing" the
mind-that is, selecting only limited mental functions as relevant
31. Id. at 211-16.
32. Id. at 249.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 204-06.
Id. at 204.
See notes 11 and 12 supra and accompanying text.
See note 12 supra.
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to responsibility-just as the M'Naghten test has been criticized."
The definition of the Disability of Mind doctrine is not imminently clear. The linguistic formulation is extremely difficult to
parse. Most persons would probably conclude that "rationality"
means the ability to accurately perceive reality or, in more psychological terms, being properly oriented to person, place, and
time. But apparently Fingarette and Hasse mean something
quite different. Their definition is evidently tied to an individual's ability to participate practically in the community's
value system and to be aware of the criminal significance of contemplated conduct. Besides being a somewhat primitive definition, it may also create substantial difficulty for jury application.
Does the test simply require that the defendant had an awareness
of societal norms? If it does, is the ALI test a clearer and more
useful statement of the relevant inquiry? The D.O.M. test does
not require the jury to consider the causal relationship, if any, of
this impairment to the criminal conduct. It simply asks the jury
to decide whether the defendant had the "mental capacity, at
least in a practical way, to take the standards of law into account." '
In detaching the inquiry even further from the medical model
of mental disease and the supposed assets of such a grounding
(verifiability and increased confidence in factfinding), have the
authors simply conferred unfettered discretion on juries, thereby
9
relying too heavily on "jury justice"? It is not clear that the
proffered test really articulates defined standards or criteria
which will yield greater consistency, predictability, or "evenhandedness" in the adjudication of these difficult issues. Indeed,
it is difficult to ascertain the full scope of the D.O.M. doctrine.
Would it, for example, exclude from criminal responsibility a
religious zealot such as Jim Jones (had he survived) who was
primarily responsible for mass suicide in Jonestown, Guyana?
Significantly, the authors conclude that a person suffering
from a complete D.O.M. at the time of the offense is much like a
very young child who is simply not capable of acting as a respon37. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966).
38. FINGARETrE & HASSE, supra note 7, at 266.
39. Judge Bazelon offers an interesting and provocative discussion of the advantages
of expansive jury discretion in assessing criminal responsibility in light of claimed mental
impairment. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., dissenting and concurring).
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sible human being in relation to the criminal law.40 A finding of
a total D.O.M. is, therefore, quite similar to the finding made at
very early common law under the "bestiality test" that an insane
criminal defendant was like an animal and thus not blameworthy.4" Whether the law ought to so dehumanize actors brought
before the bar of justice raises serious moral questions for society.
Perhaps the most telling criticism of the D.O.M. model is the
absence of reasoned argument that "irrationality" as defined by
the authors should be the essence of nonresponsibility. The
M'Naghten test of insanity excuses individuals who lack cognitive ability, since knowledge is a necessary predicate for choice
and the criminal law punishes those who chose to do wrong. Without such knowledge, there is no basis for personal blameworthiness and punishment is inappropriate. The ALI test accepts this
thesis and, in addition, permits a defendant to demonstrate, alternatively, that he could not control his behavior even though he
knew he was doing wrong.2 Thus, he also did not choose to do
wrong. Fingarette and Hasse all too frequently defend the validity
of their scheme and its primary grounding in their concept of
"rationality" by relying on its manifest correctness. As they put
it: "The three basic propositions [of the D.O.M.] express the
substance of long-persistent intuitions of common-sense that
have only erratically been explicitly expressed in the common
law. The intuitions have validity that is self-evident . . . .
Unfortunately, an appeal to intuition and self-proving obviousness is usually an argument of last resort. Its correctness remains
to be demonstrated.
Finally, it is not clear that a unitary doctrine of responsibility
encompassing every form of mental impairment or disability is
desirable. One of the traditional strengths of the common law
legal system is the ability to evolve new doctrines in light of
changing moral values and newly discovered empirical knowledge. Perhaps the current multiple doctrines of excuse or mitigation which are tailored to specific contexts provide more flexibility and are more in accord with our deeply shared values than
any unitary doctrine could be.
On balance, the Disability of Mind doctrine probably does
not accord with, nor implement, the basic moral intuitions which
40. FINGARETrE & HASSE, supra note 7, at 208, 230-31.
41. See, e.g., Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724).
42. See note 12 supra.
43. FINGARETrE & HASSE, supra note 7, at 203.
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support society's framework of criminal responsibility. It is highly
unlikely that this epic scheme will ever be adopted by any legislature or court and that would not be a disappointment.
Undoubtedly, this book, which is very readable and maintains the reader's enthusiasm and interest throughout, will provoke intense and thoughtful discussion among those who care
about justice and individual responsibility. Even though the
prognosis for implementation of the D.O.M. doctrine is not
favorable, this proposed scheme will surely stimulate a valuable
re-examination of our underlying legal, moral, and philosophic
values as they relate to individual criminal responsibility. And,
that is no small accomplishment.
John Q. La Fond*

* Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law; B.A., Yale University,
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